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INTRODUCTION 
There is an old adage from the 19th century that best describes 
power: “Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely.”1 As of 
January 2018, Google ranks among the top worldwide internet companies, 
with a market capitalization of 782 billion U.S. dollars.2 With a market 
share of 75%, Google has undisputed dominance as a search engine 
company.3 Google is just one of the major tech companies that have 
achieved unprecedented levels of success and wealth, joining the likes of 
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft. 
These companies are all hailed for their innovation and 
progressive ideals, seemingly ushering in an age of friendly, people-loving 
multinational corporations. The “tech giants” are something different than 
                                                   
1 This quote is attributed to John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, the historian and 
moralist. The Phrase Finder, https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/absolute-power-corrupts-
absolutely.html, (January 14, 2018).  
2 YAHOO FINANCE (January 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG/. 
3 Market Share Statistics for Internet Technologies, NET MARKETSHARE (January 2018), 
netmarketshare.com.  
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anything that has come before: reflecting the personalities of the quirky, 
young geniuses that built them, these Silicon Valley tech giants are 
altruistically giving it all to create a better, more connected world. 
Whereas corporations of the nineteenth and twentieth century were 
predatory, cold, and focused solely on profits, these new twenty-first 
century giants only want to build a better tomorrow. That’s why Google’s 
corporate slogan had for the longest time been “Don’t be evil.”4 Or why 
Facebook wants to “bring the world closer together.”5 
At least, that is the perception that they are trying to create. There 
is a heavily concerted effort to portray themselves as nerdy kids working 
for the betterment of humanity.6 In reality, the tech giants like Google and 
Facebook employ some of the most ruthless, calculating strategies in the 
business world.7 Google, for example, has made the majority of its revenue 
from data mining and advertisements.8 One of the main reasons they are 
so successful in selling advertisements, and one of their main sources of 
criticisms, is that they gather people’s data and sell them for more targeted 
advertising.9 Google has approached privacy hypocritically, fiercely 
defending its own privacy while violating everyone else’s.10 
One of the company’s biggest controversies came in 2010 when it 
was discovered that Google had been collecting people’s Wi-Fi data 
through its Street View cars.11 The company took information like 
people’s passwords, emails, and other personal information.12 As Enderle, 
principal analyst at technology consulting firm Enderle Group put it: “I 
think they should change their slogan to 'evil are us.' It seems like every 
time you turn around they are doing something that is at best questionable 
and at worst anti-people.”13 
In September 2017, the New America Foundation think-tank 
scholar Barry Lynn was fired.14 He alleges the firing was because 
Google—one of the think-tank’s largest donors—was unhappy with his 
                                                   
4 Paul Buchheit, Paul Buchheit on Gmail, AdSense and More, GOOGLE BLOGOSCOPED 
(July 16, 2007), http://blogoscoped.com/archive/2007-07-16-n55.html. 
5 Alex Heath, Facebook has a new mission statement: 'to bring the world closer together', 
BUS. INSIDER (June 22, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/new-facebook-mission-statement-
2017-6.  
6 Olivia Solon & Sabrina Siddiqui, Forget Wall Street – Silicon Valley is the new political 
power in Washington, THE GUARDIAN (September 3, 2017), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2017/sep/03/silicon-valley-politics-lobbying-washington. 
7 Id. 
8 Cadie Thompson, Does 'Don't be evil' still apply to Google?, CNBC (August 19, 2014), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/19/does-dont-be-evil-still-apply-to-google.html. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Solon & Siddiqui, supra note 6.  
2019                     AMERICAN OLIGARCHY & ANTITRUST LAW 121 
research, which called for tech giants such as Google, Amazon, and 
Facebook to be regulated as monopolies.15 His contention is not without 
merit: leaked emails revealed that the foundation was concerned about 
Lynn’s research potentially jeopardizing future funding.16 Moreover, Eric 
Schmidt, the chairman of Alphabet, Google’s parent company, donated 
$21 million to New America Foundation and even called it the “Eric 
Schmidt Ideas Lab.”17 
Amazon, like Google, is almost universally loved by its users,18 
and also tries to maintain a façade of altruism. Amazon is also one of the 
foremost powers of the twenty-first century, reaching a level of success 
that has so permeated commerce that their presence can only be described 
as ubiquitous. By some measures, Amazon captures nearly half of all 
online shopping.19 Online retail is just one facet of the tech giant’s 
business, with the company also producing television and films, lending 
credit, publishing, marketing, engaging in delivery and logistics, and 
manufacturing.20 With the recent acquisition of Whole Foods, Amazon 
also looks to move into the grocery and food production business.21 With 
all of these enterprises and a continuing practice of favoring aggressive 
expansion over profit, shares trade at over 900 times earnings, which tops 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index as the most expensive stock.22 Today, half 
of all U.S. households have an Amazon Prime membership, and one in 
every two dollars spent online by Americans goes to Amazon.23 Despite 
the love from both consumers and investors, in recent years Amazon has 
had its benign mask peeled back to reveal the hungry predator underneath. 
Amazon greedily swallows up smaller competitors and uses aggressive 
bully tactics in negotiations.24 Famously in 2014, in a negotiation with 
Hachette Publishing, Amazon delisted the publisher’s books from its 
website as a form of leverage.25 This is a practice, amongst other predatory 
practices, that eliminates competition and has lead Amazon to consume 
industry after industry.26 
                                                   
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Kim Hart & Ina Fried, Exclusive poll: Facebook favorability plunges, AXIOS (March 26, 
2018), https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-facebook-favorability-plunges-1522057235-b1fa31db-
e646-4413-a273-95d3387da4f2.html. 
19 Lina Kahn, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 712 (2017).  
20 Id. at 713.  
21 Heather Haddon, Amazon’s Grocery Sales Increased After It Devoured Whole Foods, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (January 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-grocery-sales-
gained-weight-after-it-devoured-whole-foods-1515934801.  
22 Kahn, supra note 1919, at 713.  
23 Olivia LaVecchia & Stacy Mitchell, Amazon's Stranglehold: How the Company's 
Tightening Grip Is Stifling Competition, Eroding Jobs, and Threatening Communities, INST. FOR LOC. 
SELF-RELIANCE 4 (Nov. 2016), http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ILSR_AmazonReport_ 
final.pdf. 
24 Kahn, supra note 19, at 715. 
25 Id.  
26 LaVecchia & Mitchell, supra note 23, at 6. 
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These Silicon Valley companies have all acted contrary to their 
perceived image, but the question is why? Why would these companies try 
so hard to appear socially progressive? After all, most people already 
expect large corporations to favor profits over customers. The answer is 
that these carefully constructed images are shrewd and calculated 
decisions made in response to the threat of antitrust enforcement. It was 
eighteen years ago when the U.S. government neutered Microsoft for 
violating antitrust law, and all of the fledgling tech companies, who would 
grow to dominate the world market, watched closely and learned an 
important lesson about the power of antitrust law.27 Eric Schmidt, then 
CEO of the tech company Novell, witnessed the impact the lengthy case 
had on Microsoft, and he took the lesson to heart.28 When Google hired 
him in 2001, Schmidt was determined to avoid the same fate that befell 
Microsoft.29 United States v. Microsoft showed the world the power of 
antitrust and impressed upon the leaders of the young tech companies the 
need to play the political game and toe the line of monopoly and oligopoly. 
30 Today, the tech giants are larger and more powerful than any company 
to come before, including Microsoft of the late 90’s.31 It is interesting, 
then, that the modern tech giants have evaded government scrutiny and 
continued to grow, seemingly unfettered. 
The state of modern antitrust law, due to a shift in legal thinking 
and practice in the last four decades and the valuable lessons learned after 
Microsoft, has led to this current level of unprecedented dominance for the 
tech titans of the twenty-first century. Google, which has had massive 
control over the advertisement and search engine market, is only now 
starting to receive antitrust scrutiny; that is, at least in Europe.32 
Domestically, antitrust law has waned in both power and 
prevalence, and the willingness of modern tech giants to play 
Washington’s game has certainly helped avoid prosecution. Back in 1997, 
before the antitrust suit, Microsoft spent just $2 million on lobbying to 
                                                   
27 Solon & Siddiqui, supra note 6. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
31 Ryan McQueeney, You’ll Never Believe Amazon’s Share of the E-Commerce Market, 
NASDAQ (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/youll-never-believe-amazons-share-of-the-
e-commerce-market-cm904080.  
32 Mark Scott, Google Fined Record $2.7 Billion in E.U. Antitrust Ruling, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/eu-google-fine.html. For the 
past two decades, antitrust law has been thriving internationally, with the EU taking an especially 
aggressive stance towards the world’s largest tech companies. Id.; see also Maurice Stucke, 
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012) (“The past twenty years witnessed more 
countries with antitrust laws and the birth and growth of the international organization of 
governmental competition authorities, the International Competition Network (ICN), with over 100 
member countries.”). 
2019                     AMERICAN OLIGARCHY & ANTITRUST LAW 123 
Washington.33 Today, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook 
have spent a combined $49 million on DC lobbying, and many of Silicon 
Valley executives go to and from senior governmental positions.34 Google 
alone spent more on lobbying than any other company, spending $9.5 
million in the first half of 2017, and $15 million the year before.35 Google 
and the other tech companies consistently use libertarian rhetoric and 
vehemently denounce anticompetitive practice, claiming that people can 
easily click other websites.36 However, these actions conflict with 
empirical data, which indicates that the tech giants’ practices result in real 
consumer harm.37 
Despite the evidence, Washington has been hesitant to pursue any 
real action against Google. And they are not the only company to play the 
political game and avoid government scrutiny. Besides the millions spent 
in lobbying, Amazon and CEO Jeff Bezos have navigated the diluted 
waters of U.S. antitrust law to become the foremost retail power and 
undisputed king of internet commerce.38 As domestic antitrust law has 
shifted from its stance of market-based structures and broad policy-driven 
goals to a narrow, economic outcome-based viewpoint, the influence of 
antitrust, and indeed our national attitude towards antitrust, has 
significantly waned.39 
For example, Amazon has structured its business to consistently 
underprice its products, to the detriment of profits.40 Due to the shift in 
legal ideology, underpricing is not viewed as anti-competitive and, in fact, 
is seen by courts to be evidence of good competition.41 It seems that when 
he planned the course for Amazon’s growth, Jeff Bezos did so with an eye 
on contemporary antitrust laws.42 Amazon is almost universally loved by 
consumers and investors and ignored by the government, and as mentioned 
above, they have toiled steadily down the road to monopoly.43 And yet 
there is real harm being done to the markets and to consumers that is now 
coming to light. Amazon’s practices are gutting suppliers who refuse to 
deal with the tech giant’s terms and fueling a sharp decline in smaller, 
independent retail business, among other cognizable harms.44 On top of 
these other harms is the elimination of over 149,000 jobs in retail, and 
                                                   
33 Solon & Siddiqui, supra note 6. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See generally, The FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (March 2015), http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/, for the FTC’s 160-page report on 
Google’s practices resulting in consumer harm. 
38 McQueeney, supra note 31.  
39 Eleanor Fox, The Goals of Antitrust: Against Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2158 
(2013).  
40 Kahn, supra note 19, at 713. 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 LaVecchia & Mitchell, supra note 23, at 6.  
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Amazon’s forcing of many of its workers to work in grueling conditions.45 
While not all harms are repressible under antitrust laws, these harms are 
necessary to show the massive impact that the company has and why it is 
important to change the way antitrust is approached and applied. 
The shifting influence of anti-trust laws in the United States has 
waned over the last four decades. Where once antitrust was called the 
“Magna Carta of free enterprise,” today the Court views antitrust as an 
annoyance at best.46 Where presidential candidates used to debate 
antitrust, now it is only mentioned in how antitrust enforcement should be 
scaled back.47 Americans once deeply cared about antitrust enforcement 
and viewed monopolies with fear and suspicion.48 However, according to 
a 2004 Gallup poll, many young Americans are not only unconcerned with 
monopolies but view large corporations with a sense of satisfaction.49 This 
new attitude is linked to the federal government no longer enforcing 
antitrust law the way it had historically and has now led to a sense of 
apathy towards monopolies on the whole.50 
In contrast to the declining influence of antitrust in America, 
antitrust is flourishing internationally: the ICN continues to grow, and 
even traditionally antitrust-skeptic countries like China, Russia, and India 
now have competition laws.51 In Europe, eight out of ten European Union 
(“EU”) citizens agreed with fundamental principles of antitrust law: that 
small companies need protection from large companies and that 
competition creates more choices and leads to more innovation.52 These 
principles are the foundation of the Clayton Act; so why then are these 
ideals prevalent in foreign antitrust regimes, yet diminished domestically 
where the Act was originally passed? To understand the answer, it is 
important to first trace the history of antitrust law. 
In this note, I will argue that the current antitrust framework is 
misguided and based on erroneous legal and economic theories originating 
from the Chicago School.53 I will argue that the neoclassical approach is 
                                                   
45 Id. at 6–7.  
46 Stucke, supra note 32, at 553. 
47 Id. In the 2000 campaign, President George W. Bush criticized the Microsoft antitrust 
case as potentially harming innovation. See id. at n.17. The president then promised to scale back 
antitrust enforcement, a trend that marks a notable shift in Republican policy that started with Reagan’s 
reforms. Id. 
48 Id. at 553–54.  
49 Linda Lyons, Youthful Optimism? Young Americans Happy with "Big Business", 
GALLUP (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/10816/Youtful-Optimism-Young-Americans-
Happy-Big-Business.aspx. 
50 Id. 
51 Stucke, supra note 32, at 552 
52 Id. at 609–10. 
53 “The Chicago School” is the name given to the neoclassical legal scholars and economic 
theorists based out of the University of Chicago in the middle of the twentieth century. Kerry 
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not only wrong when examining the legislative intent of Congress but is 
also in contravention with the policy goals and foundational principles of 
antitrust law. Furthermore, I will argue that the Chicago School’s narrow, 
outcome-based view of antitrust is ill-equipped to deal with the demands 
of the twenty-first century and especially with the online marketplace. The 
tech giants are unprecedented in their scale, and the online markets that 
they dominate are still in their infancy. The internet was not contemplated 
when antitrust laws were drafted and certainly not during the time of the 
Chicago School. That is why it is so critical to examine the original intent 
of the Sherman Act and its progeny, in order to accurately respond to the 
titanic power of these companies. 
In Part II of this note, I will detail the history of antitrust law and 
how it shifted from a broad, policy-based law to its current narrow, 
economic framework. I will detail the policy and reasoning behind the 
antitrust laws and how the old American fear of concentrated power led to 
its inception. Part III will examine the most prominent tech giants that are 
currently acting as an oligopoly, and how they are exactly the kind of 
companies that the antitrust laws were meant to be applied to in the first 
place. 
 
I. THE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAW 
A. Development of Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law began with the passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
(the “Act”) of 1890.54 The Act was born out of growing concern for the 
power of new, large business organizations called “trusts.”55 Congress 
intended to reign in the power of these trusts but left the Act’s language 
vague and very broad.56 This was done to allow the courts to develop the 
field of antitrust law.57 The principle behind the Act was to stop the 
concentration of economic power, which many lawmakers thought could 
challenge democracy.58 The Act sought to distribute power and provide 
“diversity and access to markets.”59 
The main aspects of the Act are embodied in Sections 1 and 2.60 
Section 1 of the Act “prohibits anticompetitive practices that are used to 
                                                   
Gutknecht, Apple and Amazon’s Antitrust Antics: Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right, But Maybe They 
Should, 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 160, 163 n.20 (2014).   
54 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 165; see also The Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(1890). 
55 Fox, supra note 39, at 2157. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Kahn, supra note 19, at 740. 
59 Fox, supra note 39, at 2158. 
60 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 166. 
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build and maintain market power.”61 Section 1 goes on to make illegal 
“every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . .”62 Section 2 prohibits 
the formation of monopolies, and makes illegal activities that monopolize 
trade.63 
Unfortunately, problems with the Act became immediately 
apparent, as there was little guidance or definition in the Act’s legislative 
history or in the bill’s language.64 Once the new antitrust law reached the 
United States Supreme Court for the first time, there was already 
divisiveness in both the goals and the meaning of the law.65 The justices 
were largely divided on how aggressive or conservative to be when 
wielding antitrust law, as would be the case throughout the next century.66 
However, for a law that was left open for judicial interpretation, Supreme 
Court interpretation faced a slow start.67 It was not until two decades after 
the law’s initial passing that the first major case reached the Court in 
Standard Oil v. United States.68 
The Standard Oil Court attempted to define the breadth and scope 
of antitrust law, and the best approach to its application.69 This case saw 
the birth of the “rule of reason,” which would be used to guide the analysis 
of antitrust for many decades.70 The rule of reason was created for courts 
“to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles 
of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the 
statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract was 
within the contemplation of the statute.”71 In other words, this rule put the 
general public welfare at the center with a broad view of the market as a 
whole, rather than focusing on individuals.72 
Alongside the “rule of reason,” the antitrust jurisprudence 
developed rules centered on the recognition that some business practices 
were so anticompetitive that no significant analysis was needed, and 
certain per se rules were created.73 The first per se rule came before 
Standard Oil, in the landmark antitrust case United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Association.74 There, the Court held that collusive 
                                                   
61 Id.  
62 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
63 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
64 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 167. 
65 Fox, supra note 39, at 2157. 
66 Id.  
67 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 167. 
68 Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).  
69 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 168. 
70 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 66. 
71 Id. at 64. 
72 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 168. 
73 Id. at 169. 
74 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 1; United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
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pricing is always harmful and forbidden regardless of the intent of the 
parties in the agreement.75 Since Trans-Missouri, the list of per se rules 
grew over the next several decades to include market divisions, group 
boycotts, and cartelization.76 These rules helped to flesh out the specifics 
of the Act and develop antitrust law for the next several decades.77 
The per se rules and the “rule of reason” should be understood as 
two different standards under which the Supreme Court evaluates potential 
antitrust violations.78 The per se rules are “black-letter prohibitions on 
specific types of business arrangements.”79 Since these arrangements are 
purely anticompetitive, the government must show that the arrangement 
in question “lacks any redeeming virtue.”80 When a particular restraint on 
trade falls within per se category, it is deemed unreasonable and thus 
illegal as a matter of law.81 On the other hand, the “rule of reason” is more 
like a balancing approach, with courts considering the trade restraint and 
“its context, purpose, and effect.”82 Courts must take into consideration 
“the nature of the industry, the reasons that the restraint was imposed, and 
whether or not it has the desired consequences.”83 Both rules were 
implemented on a case-by-case basis, and both were debated.84 
Following Trans-Missouri and Standard Oil, Congress enacted a 
series of laws to bolster the Act.85 The Clayton Act of 1914 would 
strengthen the Act by covering for scenarios that the Act did not.86 
Moreover, the Clayton Act provided for procedural and enforcement 
scenarios, as well as helped define common antitrust terms with 
specificity.87 The majority opinion in Standard Oil had drawn much 
criticism due to its adoption of the “rule of reason,” as the holding of the 
case gave too much discretion to the courts.88 The Clayton Act saw a 
departure from the overbroad language of the Act, by providing much 
more specific instances of unlawful acts.89 The specific provisions deal 
with price discrimination, like predatory pricing practices,90 and governs 
the mergers and acquisitions process.91 Alongside the Clayton Act, the 
                                                   
75 Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 342. 
76 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 170. 
77 Stucke, supra note 32, at 553–55. 
78 Jared Killeen, Throwing the E-Book at Publishers: What the Apple Case Tells Us About 
Antitrust Law, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 341, 354–55 (2013). 
79 Id. (emphasis added). 
80 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007). 
81 Killeen, supra note 78, at 355. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Kahn, supra note 19, at 723. 
86 Id. 
87 3-18 Federal Antitrust Law § 18.1 (2017). 
88 Id. 
89 3-18 Federal Antitrust Law § 18.2 (2017). 
90 Kahn, supra note 19, at 723. 
91 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 165. For more of the specific provisions, see Clayton 
Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
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Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), passed in the same session as 
the Clayton Act, was designed to provide a dedicated commission that 
would enforce the more specific laws of the new legislation and would be 
more effective in combating the powerful trusts.92 
The next several decades saw an increase in antitrust enforcement 
and a broadening of antitrust powers with the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936 and the amendment to the Clayton Act in 1950.93 Up 
until the 1960’s, the rules and goals of antitrust were largely agreed upon.94 
The rule of reason was the accepted approach, and per se rules continued 
to grow.95 They would reach their height in 1967 in United States v. 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. where the Supreme Court applied per se rules to 
nonprice vertical restrictions imposed on distributors by their supplier.96 
However, at this time a movement in the economic world was 
beginning to pick up steam, and the Chicago School began writing about 
antitrust law and its goals.97 Led by the influence of powerful advocates 
like Robert Bork and Richard Posner, the Chicago School derailed the 
well-established antitrust jurisprudence and greatly narrowed the scope of 
antitrust law.98 The Chicago School approach was, in essence, a price 
theory view.99 Consumer welfare is the central focus of this approach, and 
the goals of antitrust shifted to focus on outcomes, rather than enforcing 
the policy behind the Act’s passing.100 According to the Chicago School, 
the biggest indicator of consumer welfare is market efficiency.101 Market 
efficiency should not be confused with competition. Further, “competition 
can sometimes be inefficient. This is because while efficiency is an end in 
itself, competition is just one possible means of achieving it.”102 The 
Chicago School approach, therefore, suggests that restraints on trade may 
be legal if they are efficient, as this would indicate that consumer welfare 
has not been harmed.103 Thus, a business arrangement that would be illegal 
                                                   
92 3-18 Federal Antitrust Law § 18.2 (2017). 
93 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1059 
(1979). 
94 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 173.  
95 Id. 
96 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Cont'l T. 
V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
97 Gutknecht, supra note 53, at 173. 
98 Kahn, supra note 19, at 718–19.  
99 Id. at 719. 
100 Id. at 744. The Chicago School thought that courts should focus on the outcomes like 
whether or not a particular business arrangement between competitors caused prices to rise. Id. Thus, 
consumer welfare is at the heart of the Chicago School theory. Killeen, supra note 78, at 367.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 368. 
103 Id. at 368–70. The Chicago Approach is backward looking and circular in its reasoning. 
Because the raised prices did not result in consumer harm, the businesses engaging in the restraint of 
trade did not violate antitrust law. This logic is not only conclusory, but it ignores the non-economic 
harms of antitrust. 
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under the broader rule of reason and per se approaches could be found to 
be legal under the Chicago School approach.104 
The Chicago School approach gained prominence in the early 
1970’s and has since dominated the antitrust world.105 The Chicago 
School’s influence on antitrust law cannot be overstated. Supreme Court 
justices, heads of federal agencies, prominent lawyers and politicians, and 
even presidents have been influenced by the Chicago School.106 Under the 
Reagan administration, the president mandated that the government 
should stay out of the business world and shrink regulation.107 The Reagan 
administration operated under the influence of the Chicago School and 
began viewing business acts as presumptively valid.108 The result was that 
business conduct was not anticompetitive unless it resulted in consumer 
harm.109 Notable politicians like Ralph Nader and John Kenneth Galbraith 
championed the approach that consumer welfare was the sole goal of 
antitrust and that it was best achieved through market efficiency.110 This 
huge shift means that conduct which would normally have violated 
antitrust law could be legal as long as the result did not reduce consumer 
welfare.111 
From the early 1980s to the modern day, antitrust law operated 
with maximizing consumer welfare as its guiding principle: conveniently 
forgetting the ninety years of antitrust law that had come before.112 Not 
only has the legislative view of antitrust shifted, but public attitude 
towards antitrust has appreciably declined. When looking at presidential 
speeches and party platforms for the mention of antitrust, this decline can 
be seen.113 Since presidential candidates and parties have a tendency to 
only campaign on issues they think are relevant, their platforms are solid 
metrics for determining what issues interest and resonate with the 
public.114 Since the Carter administration, many presidents have invoked 
antitrust in high-profile speeches, and the last significant mention of 
antitrust from either party was in 1984 when Walter Mondale admonished 
the FTC for running “roughshod over the nation’s antitrust laws.”115 Since 
then, neither party has made any significant mention of antitrust and no 
president has had a major involvement with the antitrust cases.116 Because 
politicians will typically speak about issues they think are relevant to the 
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American people’s interests, the fact that this decline has happened shows 
that the public does not care about antitrust as they once did.117 
 
B. Antitrust Policy 
When the Act was passed by Congress in 1890, there were clear 
policy goals and populist concerns attached to the antitrust law.118 But, the 
modern concept of antitrust law birthed from the Chicago School is 
erroneous: the Chicago School’s backward-looking approach is flawed in 
its logic and ignores legislative history. More importantly, focusing on 
consumer welfare to the exclusion of everything else, and using market 
efficiency to do so, disregards the new and unique challenges presented by 
the twenty-first-century market. The world has changed dramatically with 
the internet, and the current framework of antitrust law is not equipped to 
deal with the change. 
The framework before the Chicago School’s intervention would 
be better able to handle the current market due to its broader approach and 
to the fact that antitrust law used to be driven by clear policy and goals. In 
order to understand antitrust law’s place in the modern world and to show 
that the Chicago School was clearly wrong in its approach, it is helpful to 
examine the policy and goals behind antitrust law. 
At the heart of antitrust law are the democratic sensibilities that 
shaped this country.119 Ultimately, it was the fear and mistrust of 
concentrated power in the hands of the few that powered the Progressive-
Era bill.120 Moreover, Congress did not hold the Chicago School’s view 
that the markets were self-correcting.121 Instead, the legislators believed 
that unregulated corporations could amass so much power and have so 
much control over the markets that it could potentially threaten 
democracy.122 
Antitrust law was the natural response to the fear of concentrated 
economic power and was used as the means to distribute that power.123 
When Congress passed the Act in 1890, Senator John Sherman, the bill’s 
namesake, advocated for the new law as an economic “bill of rights.”124 In 
a speech, Senator Sherman articulated the underlying rationale for the 
antitrust law, and it’s no coincidence that it rings with the voices of the 
liberty-laced rhetoric of the founding fathers. He states: “If we will not 
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endure a king as a political power, we should not endure a king over the 
production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessities of life.”125 
From this speech, it is clear that Senator Sherman believed that the 
American ideals of liberty and freedom from monarchy should extend to 
the economic world.126 He saw just how powerful the trusts were 
becoming in this era and knew the dangers that too much concentrated 
power could pose to democracy. Senator Sherman equates these trusts to 
“an emperor” and calls their leaders “autocrat[s] of trade.”127 
The fear was that the economic concentration of power by a few 
elites would destabilize democracy.128 When private individuals massed 
extraordinary wealth they could use that wealth to “influence 
government.”129 The senators believed that monopolies were an existential 
threat to any republic, and thus laws with the authority of Congress and 
the will of the people were required in order to divide these monopolies.130 
These sentiments were echoed almost universally, as the Sherman Act 
passed with nearly unanimous support.131 
The American ideals of liberty and the suspicion of concentrated 
power in the hands of a few gave life to the antitrust law, but so too did 
the concerns for robust markets and healthy competition.132 These 
concerns stem from the belief that healthy competition causes healthy 
markets.133 This is because competition ensures that business will innovate 
and will continually try to give the best price to consumers.134 An 
efficiency standard like what the Chicago School advocated for does not 
further these consumer goals, and the likely result of this purely economic 
view of antitrust law “will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate 
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive 
role in economic affairs.”135 
The American preference for checks and balances aligns with 
antitrust law legislative history, but the Chicago School approach ignores 
this and a chief harm that antitrust law was created to defend. Congress 
has “exhibited a clear concern” that too much centralized power 
“dominated by a few corporate giants” could lead to “the overthrow of 
democratic institutions and the installation of a totalitarian regime.”136 
While it is uncertain that a massive concentration of economic power in a 
                                                   
125 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890). 
126 Kahn, supra note 19, at 740. 
127 Id. 
128 Kahn, supra note 19, at 740. 
129 Id. 
130 21 CONG. REC. 3146 (1890). 
131 Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 
(2016) (statement of Bill Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
132 Fox, supra note 39, at 2160. 
133 Baer, supra note 131. 
134 Fox, supra note 39, at 2160. 
135 Pitofsky, supra note 93, at 1051. 
136 Id. at 1054. 
BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW     VOL. XII:I 
 
132 
few elites would lead to the downfall of our nation, it is telling that 
democracies and free market systems have almost always gone hand in 
hand, but totalitarian regimes have almost never followed those 
systems.137 In fact, studying historical and contemporaneous democracies 
has revealed there is “an underlying common basis for democracy and a 
market economy, and common characteristics between democracy and a 
deconcentrated economic system.”138 
Because of the close connection between political goals associated 
with antitrust law and America’s broader ideals, it is important to not 
separate the two when implementing antitrust. As free markets and 
individual liberty are so intrinsically tied to American democracy, the 
contemporary method of focusing on economic consumer welfare does not 
serve our national interests, and this method should be abandoned. 
 
II. THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW SHOULD BE 
APPLIED TO THE TECH GIANTS, AND FULFILL THE GOALS OF 
ANTITRUST 
 
A. The Narrow View Problem and How the Law Should be Applied 
The current regime of antitrust law is narrowly focused and does 
not account for all forms of anticompetitive harm, especially in the context 
of the online market. The heart of the current approach is concentrating on 
market efficiency through the lens of consumer welfare.139 Not only is this 
view flawed when compared to the original goals of antitrust law, but this 
view also forgets other critically important consumer interests like 
customer service and product quality, variety, and innovation.140 Because 
the current antitrust framework fails to account for these concerns, the 
framework should be abandoned. 
Abandoning the narrow market efficiency approach would 
faithfully apply antitrust law to the tech giants, who have escaped scrutiny 
due to their care to avoid implicating consumer welfare concerns. The tech 
giants have gained massive unprecedented power because the market 
efficiency approach has not been able to meet the unique internet 
marketplace. Certainly, the drafters of the Act and the later scholars of the 
Chicago School could not have possibly envisioned the online market 
place, but the original Act intended to stop the concentration of market 
power and the creation of monopolies and oligopolies.141 The current 
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framework betrays that intent and decades of jurisprudence.142 It ignores 
our interests as consumers, as workers, as citizens, and as competing 
entrepreneurs.143 It also falsely conflates the goal of antitrust law as an 
outcome-focused calculation, rather than addressing the concern over the 
distribution of power in the marketplace.144 Hence, the current framework 
needs to be abandoned: the focus on welfare betrays the legislative history 
of antitrust and fails in the face of the current market’s unique challenges. 
Moreover, the current approach fails because it does not prevent 
harm to competition.145 Since the current framework of antitrust law solely 
focuses on price and outcomes, enforcement cannot begin until after the 
harm has already occurred.146 Specifically, the current approach ignores 
how and when a company acquires market power and only acts after a 
company has become so dominate that the company already rendered the 
market noncompetitive.147 This approach is self-defeating and makes little 
sense: what is the point of protecting competition in the market once the 
market is no longer competitive? Logically, it makes much more sense to 
protect competition when the market is at risk of becoming 
noncompetitive and is conducive to the legislative purpose behind antitrust 
law.148 
The Chicago School’s approach not only betrays legislative intent, 
but also fails on its own terms. The current approach misapplies the law 
because the approach conflates market power with market efficiency and 
assumes only price and outcome can indicate competition.149 In fact, 
growing evidence shows that the Chicago School approach has led to 
higher prices, but not to any efficiency gains.150  
Further, the current antitrust framework has allowed such a 
concentration of power in a few massive companies which bars small 
businesses and entrepreneurs from entering the marketplace and from 
competing.151 There has been a 50% drop in small business ownership in 
America since the Reagan administration castrated antitrust law by 
implementing the Chicago School philosophy.152 Every administration 
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since 1981 has implemented the current antitrust framework and has “all 
but suspended traditional enforcement of America’s antimonopoly laws 
. . . .”153 As a result, “regulators have done almost nothing to stop the great 
waves of mergers and acquisitions, with the result that control over most 
major economic activities is now more consolidated than at any time since 
the Gilded Age.”154 
Clearly, the current antitrust framework allows for a highly 
concentrated market structure. This harms consumer interests overall and 
betrays the goal of antitrust law. Robust competition promotes consumer 
interest in a way that market efficiency does not.155 An open market that 
is free from domination by industry giants, who hoard power, best 
promotes competition. This harms consumers and workers, and, as 
expressed by Senator Sherman, threatens democracy.156 Because of the 
current application of antitrust laws, a small minority can amass outsized 
wealth and can influence government.157 The legislators also wanted to 
avoid a state of affairs where “private discretion by a few in the economic 
sphere controls the welfare of all.”158 With the unprecedented power of the 
tech giants and their enormous spending in Washington, D.C., it certainly 
seems that these companies are exactly to whom the original drafters of 
the Act wanted antitrust law to apply. 
Unfortunately, the current doctrine of antitrust law does not see 
the tech giants as anticompetitive because they employ techniques such as 
predatory pricing, which the current framework does not recognize as 
harmful; in fact, the current framework presumes that a corporation’s 
activities are benign unless they lead to higher prices.159 Moreover, courts 
and agencies mistakenly believe that practices like large corporate mergers 
actually promote efficiency, and these courts and agencies fear false 
positives.160 The current antitrust landscape has led to a paradox where 
“modern U.S. antitrust protects monopoly and oligopoly, suppresses 
innovative challenges, and stifles efficiency.”161 Focusing on efficiency 
has been illogical because it has not taken into account any post-merger 
inefficiencies and has led to the creation of firms that are too big to fail.162 
The best guardian of competition is a competitive process, and the 
unbridled power of the tech giants effectively acts as a barrier to entry.163 
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The courts should abandon the Chicago School approach, and no longer 
ignore the tech giants. 
 
B. Amazon 
Easily the world’s largest online retailer, Amazon has 
unchallenged power over online commerce.164 In fact, one study shows 
that 44% of U.S. consumers use Amazon before any other product search 
engine.165 Amazon also controls 46% of all online commerce in the United 
States alone.166 Half of all U.S. household members are subscribed to 
Amazon Prime, and Amazon sells more products than any other retailer, 
on or offline.167 Indeed, the power and reach of Amazon is “something 
new in the history of American business.”168 
It is important to detail the extent of Amazon’s reach in order to 
show that the online retailer is the exact kind of centralized threat that the 
Act framers were concerned about. Not only is Amazon the largest online 
retailer, but they are also involved in groceries, film and television, 
pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing.169 Amazon further provides the 
cloud-based infrastructure for most of the country, powering everything 
from Netflix to the CIA.170 In five years, estimates show that more than 
two-thirds of all online commerce will be captured by Amazon.171 
Moreover, Amazon has spread into dozens of industries and captured 
many businesses.172 When we do business online, we may not think we are 
dealing with Amazon, but in actuality, we are buying from one of the many 
companies that they have conquered.173 It owns other large e-commerce 
brands like AbeBooks, Woot, and Shopbop.174 It owns Diapers.com and 
the shoe retailer Zappos.175 It even owns Twitch, the number one video 
game streaming website.176 
Amazon also recently obtained an ocean shipping license, 
allowing it to ship freight between China and the U.S.177 Amazon’s level 
of dominance and power is more akin to a small country than a 
corporation. It is due to the uniqueness of the online market place and the 
critical failures of courts and agencies to understand the online market 
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combined with the inadequacy of the modern Chicago School framework 
of antitrust law that has let Amazon grow out of control. 
The scale of its growth can best be seen by its control over book 
sales. Amazon started as a simple retailer for used books, but in 2009 they 
reportedly had achieved a “90% market share of e-book sales.”178 This 
state of affairs led to a highly publicized dispute between Apple and 
Amazon.179 That case, and the underlying facts, are a great example of the 
tactics Amazon has used to achieve monarchical power.180 It also 
showcases the failures of the current antitrust framework and the failures 
of the Chicago School’s reasoning. 
Amazon dominates the e-book industry through predatory 
pricing.181 Predatory pricing is the practice of cutting prices so low that 
competitors cannot effectively compete.182 This strategy is one that 
Amazon has used consistently to achieve its power and success.183 The 
important point to note about predatory pricing is that the Chicago School 
expressly stated that predatory pricing could not lead to sustained 
success.184 Robert Bork, the leading scholar of the Chicago School, wrote 
that the concept of predatory pricing was unlikely even a real 
phenomenon, because it was irrational and did not reflect the Chicago 
School assumption that all businesses are profit-seeking, rational actors.185 
This stance is empirically wrong. As part of its effort to achieve the 90% 
market share of e-books, Amazon priced bestsellers at $9.99, “which was 
substantially lower than the price for hardcover versions.”186 Amazon has 
consistently taken losses over the past twenty years, putting growth over 
profits and directly contradicting Bork.187 These predatory practices were 
so effective that it forced Apple and the five largest publishers to work 
together in order to compete.188 Amazon has lowered its prices to 
predatory levels, invested heavily in expanding, and grown in scale at the 
expense of profits—practices that directly undercut contemporary antitrust 
thinking and practice.189 This has allowed them to avoid scrutiny, and 
shows how inept the current antitrust framework is and how badly reform 
is needed. 
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Another anticompetitive practice Amazon has employed in its rise 
to power is its expansion into multiple business lines.190 Amazon has 
vertically integrated with many manufacturers and producers and has 
reached the point where “Amazon’s rivals are also its customers.”191 For 
example, retailers that compete with Amazon will use its delivery services 
and competing media companies will often buy a space on Amazon’s 
platform in order to show their contact.192 In the last year alone Amazon 
doubled the number of warehouses it operates, purchased thousands of 
truck trailers, leased cargo planes, and increased its worth to nearly twice 
that of Walmart.193 One investor, Chamath Palihapitiya, the owner of the 
Golden State Warriors, has called Amazon a potential “multi-trillion-
dollar monopoly hiding in plain sight.”194 
Palihapitiya’s comment highlights an important point about 
Amazon: its growing power is quiet and in the background.195 Much of its 
unprecedented success comes from its use of new technology to mine data 
about our buying and browsing, and from its using that data to selectively 
raise its prices.196 But Amazon’s pricing practices are not the only 
monopolistic activities it engages in: 
 
Amazon increasingly controls what products make it to market 
and appear before us as we’re browsing. It has the power to pick 
winners and losers, which is alarming enough in the context of 
toys or fashion, but downright tyrannical when it comes to the 
creative, cultural, and political life of the nation.197 
 
This type of behavior is exactly what the original goal of antitrust law was 
designed to stop.  
 Amazon’s activities in the e-book realm shows the company’s 
predatory practices towards its peers, including the tech giant’s incident 
with the e-commerce company Quidsi, the firm behind Diapers.com.198 In 
2009, Amazon offered to buy Quisi, a company that had emerged as a top 
competitor in diaper sales.199 When the founders refused, Amazon slashed 
all prices of diapers on its platform.200 Amazon cut the prices by 30%–a 
result of Amazon’s online algorithms tracking other companies’ prices and 
then adjusting their own prices.201 Amazon would immediately slash its 
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prices in response to any Quidsi changes.202 Amazon slashed its prices so 
much in order to outperform Quidsi that Amazon was “prepared to lose 
$100 million over three months.”203 Amazon’s tactics worked and stifled 
Quidsi’s growth.204 Eventually, Amazon aggressively relaunched its bid to 
buy Quidsi, who capitulated “largely out of fear.”205 Thus Amazon 
swallowed one of its chief competitors in online retail, and the FTC let it 
happen without a peep about antitrust concerns.206  
The important point is that a year after buying out Quidsi, Amazon 
raised its prices and cut back the Amazon Mom program, which had been 
used to offer generous discounts while Quidsi was still Amazon’s rival.207 
The prices hiked over the course of the next three years, leading to 
customers expressing their frustrations online and threatening to take their 
business to Diapers.com.208 Unfortunately, the Quidsi takeover meant that 
Diapers.com was essentially Amazon.209 
This incident highlights the failures of the Chicago School and 
Robert Bork’s thinking. It runs contrary to the contemporary notion that 
predatory pricing is not a path to buying up a competitor.210 The Chicago 
School’s view can hardly be blamed. It is entirely logical to assume that 
underpricing and intentionally losing profit would not lead to any kind of 
monopolistic success. However, that just shows how unprepared the 
current antitrust framework is to deal with the online tech giants. 
Amazon is violating antitrust by their integration and expansion 
into other businesses, and by their pricing tactics.211 But Amazon is also 
providing a massive barrier to entry and stifling competition.212 This is 
because investment in online platforms is not constrained by physical 
barriers.213 Courts have failed to recognize this distinction, and failed to 
recognize the psychological intimidation that the tech giants like Amazon 
employ in order to block startups from intruding on their business.214 
Furthermore, Amazon used its massive power to leverage itself 
into other businesses. The tech giant negotiated lower prices with UPS 
because it makes up a massive portion of the shipping company’s business 
and, moreover, Amazon expanded its empire into physical infrastructure 
                                                   
202 Id.  
203 LaVecchia & Mitchell, supra note 23, at 17.  
204 Kahn, supra note 19, at 769. 
205 Id. at 770. 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 771. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 772. 
214 Id. 
2019                     AMERICAN OLIGARCHY & ANTITRUST LAW 139 
by building warehouses in excess of $13 billion.215 Amazon vertically 
integrated its online platform into delivery at an astonishing rate, and 
proved to be a great barrier to entry into the market.216 The problem with 
the current framework is that it does not account for these barriers to entry 
and its harmful effect on competition.217 This is because under the current 
model, antitrust scrutiny only applies if Amazon used its dominance to 
hike the prices, focusing solely on the harm to the consumer and ignoring 
the harm to the competitor.218 
Last year, Amazon expanded into a field completely unrelated to 
retail and books. It acquired the grocery store Whole Foods.219 The reason 
that this raises antitrust concerns is because it now gives Whole Foods 
exclusive access among all grocery retailers to Amazon’s massive 
platform.220 As Ramsi Woodcock argues, “[t]hat is bad for consumers 
because it means that Whole Foods may come to dominate the grocery 
world not by offering better products for the best prices, as you'd find in a 
well-functioning market, but because of the promotional advantage that 
comes from its tie-up with Amazon.”221 Under the current framework, 
antitrust law focuses on consumer welfare through the outcome of 
increased price. However, this is in contravention with the express purpose 
of antitrust law.222 Amazon is causing much harm to competition, to 
business owners, to manufacturers, and to workers, and this harm will pass 
on to the consumer if antitrust law is not reformed and applied correctly.223 
One avenue for reform that would allow the courts to apply 
antitrust law against Amazon would be to include a presumption of 
predatory pricing when it can be identified that a company is pricing well 
below the average variable cost—a metric that most appellate courts agree 
is calculable.224 It is inappropriate to use the current metric for predatory 
pricing, the probability of a company recouping the losses of lowering 
prices.225 This is because this analysis “diminish[es] the significance of the 
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price-below-cost element.”226 A good method advocated is to presume 
predatory pricing of below-cost sellers when a company dominates a 
market.227 Whatever constitutes domination should be left up to the courts 
to develop, but there can be no doubt that Amazon dominates the market. 
Moreover, a reform to antitrust law is appropriate in the case of 
Amazon and other tech giants, and involves applying a stricter standard 
for vertical integration. The current framework does not address how 
companies can leverage their power in one sector to dominate another 
sector. The courts should apply a stricter standard against corporations that 
have reached a certain threshold of dominance.228 This is because the 
current framework allows for a platform’s involvement in multiple related 
and unrelated lines of businesses, which can create conflicts of interest and 
lead to businesses favoring themselves over competitors.229 A prophylactic 
approach that prevents these harms would be much more effective in the 
case of Amazon than policing them after the fact. In Amazon’s case, a 
preemptive and broader approach would stop the company from 
dominating as a retailer and then entering into a market and competing 
directly with companies that depend on its services for their business.230 
Finally, replacing the current price and consumer welfare 
approach with a broader rule-of-reason analysis is another possible venue 
to applying antitrust to Amazon. This involves analyzing the 
procompetitive effects of Amazon’s conduct and balancing them with its 
anticompetitive effects.231 Amazon is clearly causing anticompetitive 
effects.232 Increasing industry concentration in the tech giants such as 
Amazon is a danger to our markets and is a harm that Congress intended 
to prevent. 
 
C. Google  
Google has an unprecedented amount of control and influence. A 
recent study shows that Google and Facebook combined have captured 
83% of all ad revenue, and 73% of U.S. digital advertising.233 Google 
dominates ad space and digital markets and has recently been the target of 
                                                   
226 Id. at 1752.  
227 Kahn, supra note 19, at 792.  
228 Id. at 793.  
229 Id.  
230 Id. 
231 Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden Shifting, 
PERSPECTIVES IN ANTITRUST (January 22, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/antitrust_law/at303000_ebulletin_20130122.authcheckdam.pdf.  
232 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS ISSUE BR., supra note 150, at 4.  
233 David Chavern, Protect the News From Google and Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/protect-the-news-from-google-and-facebook-1519594942.  
2019                     AMERICAN OLIGARCHY & ANTITRUST LAW 141 
antitrust actions in the EU.234 Officials at the FTC investigated Google in 
2011 and concluded that the tech giant used anticompetitive tactics and 
“abused its monopoly power” in ways that harmed internet users and 
rivals, and favored its own business.235 In the EU alone, Google has 
captured 90% of the online search market.236 As the European competition 
chief Margarethe Vestager said, “Google’s magnificent innovations don’t 
give it the right to deny competitors the chance to innovate.”237 
 On top of the uncontested dominance of the search engine market 
share, Google owns the Android operating system which holds an 81% 
market share of all operating systems.238 The EU’s antitrust chief alleges 
that Google uses its ownership of Android to “pre-install[] . . . apps and 
services onto Android smartphones” to give itself preferential treatment 
over its rivals.239 Google counter-argued that its software is open to all; 
however, the pre-installation of Google apps and services, like Google 
Chrome, excludes other rival search engines and has “made it difficult, if 
not impossible, for rival search engines and smartphone app stores” to 
compete with Google.240 Google has abused its dominance to harm 
cellphone manufacturers who are increasingly reliant on the Tech Giant 
and have been bound by Google’s contracts.241 
Google requires cellphone manufacturers to preinstall the 
company’s services, and had given the manufacturers financial incentives 
to favor Google’s services over its competitors.242 Moreover, Google has 
used its dominance over the internet by diverting traffic from its 
competitors towards its own site.243 
However, one of the biggest concerns that the tech giants like 
Google implicates involves data. The control over data is a new field of 
commerce that has advertisers buying and selling personal information in 
order to better sell products.244 This new field may also enable new forms 
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of anticompetitive activity that lawmakers have not contemplated.245 The 
control over data allows Google to instill such dominance that it acts as an 
impenetrable barrier to entry, and stifles competition.246 Finally, control 
over data unfairly harms competition because it allows for leveraging: that 
is, Google can use all the data about its user on one platform, such as Gmail 
or Google Chrome, and then use it to benefit another one of its businesses 
in a different market (YouTube, for example).247 
Google allocates data gained from one business to advance the 
interests of its other businesses. For example, Google can use data gained 
from its other businesses like Gmail or YouTube to refine searches and 
highlight certain ads or products higher on a search and bury other 
products lower on the search.248 Moreover, the existence of data driven 
businesses like Google implicates other non-price competition concerns, 
such as privacy protection offered to consumers.249 The privacy concern is 
increasingly important to consumers when they decide which email to use, 
which search engine to use, and which browser to use.250 
Because privacy and personal data is an important choice for 
consumers, agencies and courts should closely examine activity and 
mergers of tech companies like Google and determine if these companies’ 
activities would likely reduce incentives to compete and to offer better 
privacy guarantees to the consumer.251 Therefore, a viable antitrust theory 
that could be applied to Google’s unmatched control over personal data is 
that the loss of privacy is similar to a reduction in the quality of a product 
or service.252 The FTC’s investigation of a Google merger echoes this 
sentiment, suggesting that consumer privacy is one of the “non-price 
attributes of competition.”253 Unfortunately, privacy is a hard-to-quantify 
harm, yet that does not mean that the law should disregard it as a concern. 
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A different antitrust framework is required for Google, because it 
is unique in American business, and the current framework was not created 
to comprehend the competitive harms that the tech giants have wrought. 
As Allen P. Grunes and Maurice E. Stuck argue, the tech giants are not 
just data driven companies, “they are media companies.”254 As 
“advertising-supported media, they, like much of the traditional media, are 
free to the user.”255 Advertisers subsidize the costs associated with the 
online service companies, “and advertising dollars account for most of the 
revenues.”256 However, online service companies differ from traditional 
media in that they collect massive amounts of user data in real time and 
have a direct contract with the user.257 Moreover, these companies have 
been able to convince some of the lower courts that, because their services 
are free, there is no market that can be harmed, which is clearly erroneous. 
Google serves as a massive barrier to entry. The court in United 
States v. Bazaarvoice explicitly recognized that data can serve as an entry 
barrier.258 The hoarding of data is incentivized economically by the fact 
that online companies make money by using data to sell targeted ads.259 If 
data is not hoarded, then the money slows down. Therefore, it is not 
realistic to assume that the giant online service companies will willingly 
slow their data gathering to provide better privacy for consumers. It is also 
very difficult, because of Google’s dominance, for other companies to 
enter the market and provide better privacy for consumers.260 There have 
been alternative online services like DuckDuckGo, but these companies 
have searches in the low millions compared to Google’s 5 billion searches 
daily.261 
Treating online companies like Google the same as traditional 
media companies or focusing solely on one side of the market is a mistake 
and does not effectively address the harm to competition. Other potential 
avenues for enforcers and courts to apply antitrust law to Google and 
online service companies is to recognize data-driven exclusionary 
conduct. As noted above, data-driven companies like Google will often try 
to prevent rivals and smaller startups from accessing the data needed to 
grow, in order to maintain a competitive advantage.262 
Courts and agencies should look to “how the control of personal 
information contributes market power in the digital economy and the 
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implications for data protection” and “the risks to the consumers posed by 
concentrations and the abuse of market dominance where firms possess 
massive amounts of personal data,” among other concerns, when 
analyzing the activities of Google and other online service platforms.263 
The FTC’s investigation of Google in 2012 revealed that the company had 
been engaged in data-exclusionary practices such as entering into 
exclusionary agreements with websites for better search positions and 
search advertising services.264 In an FTC memo, the Commission 
explicitly wrote that “Google has monopoly power in one or more properly 
defined markets.”265 Their recognition of Google’s monopoly and their 
failure to pursue an action suggests that the current antitrust framework is 
flawed and is not prepared to meet the challenge of the online tech 
companies. If the current Chicago School framework is abandoned and a 
framework that utilizes the suggested methods for enforcing antitrust law 
is used instead, then antitrust law would be back to serving the policy goals 
that the original drafters of the Sherman Act envisioned.266 
 
D. Facebook 
The online tech companies pose unique threats to competition that 
the Chicago School framework is not prepared to handle. As discussed 
previously in Section II.C, there is a new, emerging market in the form of 
buying and selling personal data in the advertising space.267 Google is not 
the only company that implicates antitrust problems with data.268 
Facebook also has an antitrust problem, and similar to Google, Facebook 
is receiving strict scrutiny in Europe but almost none at home.269 
Regulators in Germany ordered Facebook to stop collecting and storing 
data about German users.270 The German competition authority further 
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opened an investigation to determine if Facebook had misused its 
dominant position to collect people’s information.271 
One especially apparent antitrust problem for Facebook is that it 
refuses to let any company compete with it. Facebook is afraid of going 
the way of MySpace and becoming extinct due to a new, innovative start 
up supplanting it.272 Facebook is the dominant social media platform today 
with over 1.7 billion users monthly.273 Mark Zuckerberg, the creator and 
CEO of Facebook, noticed two companies that were growing so rapidly 
that they threatened Facebook’s complete dominance of social media.274 
The two companies were Instagram and WhatsApp, and “both were 
amassing users at an amazing rate.”275 Instead of innovating and trying to 
outcompete the two companies, Facebook bought Instagram for $1 
Billion, and WhatsApp for $21.8 billion.276 
This is “par for the course in Silicon Valley” and is one of the 
many reasons that the tech giants have become so overwhelmingly 
dominant.277 The United States and Europe both examined the Facebook 
and WhatsApp merger and cleared it, deciding the deal did not pose 
antitrust concerns.278 However, they reasoned that the messenger service 
was an alternative form of competition.279 This reasoning ignores the fact 
that dominance for a social media company is about users and views, as 
that directly correlates to advertiser dollars.280 The current antitrust 
framework does not work, and as one commentator noted, “[t]he antitrust 
system results in the increasing oligopoly that we have, where a few 
companies dominate major industries, accruing the wealth and power that 
go with it as potential disrupters are swallowed at birth, the way Cronus, 
the titan in Greek mythology, ate his young to prevent their uprising.”281 
Alongside data hoarding and the swallowing up of smaller 
startups, Facebook poses another unique concern to our markets and our 
democracy. This is a phenomenon that has emerged in recent years and 
has dominated the public conscious. This problem is, of course, fake news, 
which is also an antitrust problem.282 
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As written above, tech giants like Google and Facebook double as 
media companies. When viewed this way, Facebook is competing with 
news publishers. “They compete for users’ time spent online, user data and 
advertising dollars.”283 Facebook has effectively lessened the number of 
users that visit traditional news sites and directs the users to get their news 
from Facebook, which has helped the decline of legitimate news and 
helped facilitate the rise of fake news.284 Legitimate news sites have 
overhead costs that fake news sites do not, and by giving a large platform 
to these fake news sites, they are indirectly helping the spread of fake news 
and destroying potential competitors in the process.285 “Facebook is a 
juggernaut in news distribution, big data and online advertising.”286 In fact, 
66% of the 1.7 billion monthly users get their news from the platform, 
according to Pew Research.287 That adds up to 44% of U.S. adults who get 
their news from Facebook.288 
Facebook uses certain methods to keep users on its site and to 
divert its users away from news sites.289 For example, Facebook hosts the 
content of legitimate news sites, but because it defaults to in-app browsing 
or embedded images, people can get the content from the news sites but 
give Facebook all the clicks.290 This is an antitrust problem for a variety of 
reasons—chief among them is the fact that Facebook is leveraging its 
market dominance to capture all the traffic that should be going to its 
competitors who actually produce the content, while fake news publishers 
are given a platform on Facebook that also lessens the traffic to its 
competitors.291 
There can be no doubt that legitimate news is under attack from 
the tech giants like Google and Facebook.292 The duopoly holds 83% of 
all digital ad revenue.293 Interestingly, this implicates one of the major 
concerns behind antitrust policy: namely that centralization of power in 
market actors harms our republic. Specifically, the spread of fake news 
and the increasing reliance of the American people on the tech giants for 
their information leads to the decline of legitimate information, which is 
the basis for any politically aware citizen’s choices. 
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Antitrust law can be applied to Facebook as outlined by the 
European Commission’s investigation into the Facebook/WhatsApp 
merger. There, the EU outlined a roadmap for antitrust enforcement.294 
Enforcers should check to see if the Tech Giant controls any “essential 
parts” of the network.295 They should check whether users of consumer 
communications applications are locked-in to any physical network, and 
check whether the company controls and limits the “portability of data.”296 
Finally, enforcers should check if parties’ applications are pre-installed on 
a large base of mobile phones, tablets, or computers, and if “status quo 
bias” may affect consumers’ choice.297 
Ultimately, using this roadmap to determine if Facebook or other 
tech giants are engaging in anticompetitive activity would help agencies 
and courts by giving them specific, cognizable factors to consider. The 
current narrow framework of antitrust law could be applied to Facebook 
through these factors, but an overall change in the antitrust approach 
should be taken in order to meet the challenges posed by the tech giants. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Antitrust law is not in a good place. The framework and analysis 
has shifted based on the theories of a few scholars in the Chicago School. 
Their undue influence resulted in a warping of antitrust law. No longer 
does antitrust law follow the goals of the original drafters of the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts. What once was a law designed to act as a safeguard 
against centralized mercantilism from encroaching on our democracy has 
become a much narrower and much weaker field of law. Senator Sherman 
and his Congress saw the threat that centralized economic power posed to 
America’s freedom. It is a shame that the current lawmakers and agencies 
seem to be blind, or purposefully ignorant, to the dangers posed by the 
massive tech giants and, in general, the dominant multinational 
corporations that have largely escaped scrutiny. 
 The history of antitrust law and the legislative intent of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts make it clear that antitrust law was supposed 
to be applied much more broadly and to companies who are as dominant 
and centralized as the tech giants. Amazon may be the most powerful 
private economic actor to ever exist; it is certainly unique in the history of 
American business. Amazon’s dominance has led to unprecedented 
growth and to the stifling of any and all competitors, which has further led 
to lower wages and higher prices. The direction that Amazon is headed 
seems almost dystopian, but antitrust law as it should be applied would 
definitely curb this threat and restore competition to the online market. By 
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abandoning the current framework, recognizing predatory pricing as a 
legitimate antitrust concern, reworking the framework of the vertical 
integration analysis, and applying a much broader rule of reason approach, 
antitrust law could be applied to Amazon. 
Google is a data-hoarding monopoly that is shutting down anyone 
with differing views and using highly aggressive tactics to bludgeon 
dissenters into submission. Google’s tactics developed under the cutthroat 
Eric Schmidt have sent a clear message to competitors and cooperators 
alike: play ball, or else. The android software that comes pre-installed with 
Google apps and the appropriation of personal data from one platform to 
benefit other Google businesses to the detriment of its competitors is a 
clear antitrust harm to competition. By abandoning the current Chicago 
School framework which only recognizes consumer welfare through a 
price-changing analysis and instead focusing on the company’s effects on 
competition (which antitrust was originally designed to look at), antitrust 
law would be effective in curbing many of Google’s anticompetitive 
practices. Furthermore, the current framework and agencies do not show 
a proper understanding of Google’s activities. They must look to data-
driven exclusionary practices and the creation of massive barriers to entry. 
Finally, antitrust law could help to stop the spread of fake news 
and mass misinformation that is plaguing our nation, harms that are 
directly implicated by the policy goal of antitrust to protect democracy. By 
applying antitrust law to Facebook and treating Facebook as a media 
company directly competing with legitimate news organizations, the 
massive spread of misinformation can be stopped. Moreover, by applying 
antitrust principles to stop Facebook from swallowing up competition, and 
by breaking up Facebook’s ownership over other social media companies, 
antitrust law would help facilitate stronger competition and ultimately help 
consumers. Antitrust enforcers should look to users and clicks to 
determine dominance in the social media market, as that directly correlates 
to advertising money. 
Antitrust law could be robust and healthy and further the original 
goals that Senator Sherman and his colleagues intended. If the Chicago 
School framework of consumer welfare is abandoned and instead antitrust 
law focuses on the harm to competition, then antitrust law’s legislative 
purpose would be satisfied. At the same time, this would stop the tech 
giants from completely controlling the destiny of both online and offline 
markets. Our nation’s exercise of democracy depends on a fully informed 
populace who elect representatives without undue influence from an 
oligopoly. There is too much at stake, and therefore antitrust law needs to 
see a big change in the coming years.
